

# Authentication Issues for Financial Services *And some related issues*



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# Agenda

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- ◆ A model for placing authentication in context
- ◆ Examples of modern authentication problems
  - “Identity Theft”
  - Role of Biometrics
  - The Non-Repudiation Myth
  - Consumer/Merchant Authentication
- ◆ Some real-world requirements
- ◆ The new players
- ◆ Who wins? Who loses?

# What is authentication?

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- ◆ Authenticate: Determine to some level of assurance that a party is entitled to a specific set of credentials—*i.e.*, a procedure or mechanism that tests entitlement claim
- ◆ Credential: That which gives a title or claim to credit or confidence [*syn.* certificate]
  - Name of individual or organization, address, telephone #
  - Bank account, credit card account (ability to pay)
  - Credit approval, letter of credit (statement of creditworthiness)
  - Social Security Number, driver's license number
  - Employee, badge number
  - Academic diploma, certificate of accreditation
  - Parent or guardian [of some child], Child of some parent

# What authentication is not...

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
- ◆ Identification: distinguish some person or thing within a larger set by means of unique characteristics
  - No thesaurus lists authentication as a synonym of identification
  
- ◆ Authorization: an expression of intent or a commitment to abide by certain terms & conditions
  
- ◆ Access Control: determine whether or not a party should be granted access to information or resources
  
- ◆ Single Sign-On: consistent access control measures deployed across multiple systems in a convenient manner

# Sources of confusion...


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- ◆ Authorization, access control, & single sign-on can share common mechanisms & credentials with authentication
  - Authentication is one step in access control and single sign-on
  - Authentication is an elemental mechanism of authorization
- ◆ In the absence of strong authentication, identification has been used as a proxy
  - *A source of many modern problems!*
  - A whole industry has emerged to provide “identification” facts
- ◆ Authentication has been confused with enrollment or registration
  - Identity can be relevant during registration or enrollment for credentials

# Authentication: Confidence Meter



# Authentication



# Registration

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- ◆ The means by which one party formalizes a relationship with the registering party and is granted a set of credentials or is bound to credentials
  - Registration can be explicit or implicit
    - ◆ Explicit: Party specifically requests to register
    - ◆ Implicit: Party is registered as a byproduct of other actions (e.g., merchants often register customers upon completion of their first purchase)
  - The identity of the party receiving credentials may be relevant during registration (or may not be)
- ◆ Registration is generally based on some assessment of a party's fitness or "reputation"
- ◆ Third parties can act as registrars, and then vouch for credentials in subsequent authentications



# Enrollment

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
- ◆ While “enrollment” and “registration” are synonyms in normal English usage, it is helpful to draw the following distinctions:
  - Registration: a one-time process used to formalize a relationship between two or more parties
  - Enrollment: granting of rights or credentials based on an established relationship (prior registration)
    - ◆ Registration and enrollment may occur concurrently, and often do
    - ◆ There may be many enrollments (and de-enrollments) for any one registered relationship
    - ◆ E.g., A customer registers with a bank, and subsequently enrolls for a checking account, debit card, credit card, online access, CD, IRA, etc.

# Authenticator binding

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
- ◆ Authenticator: any parameter or attribute that can be used to evaluate the authenticity of some claim or thing
  - “Authentication factor” is a commonly used synonymous term that is too often misused
  - Identifier is another near synonym
- ◆ An enrollment process is needed to bind an authenticator to an associated party
- ◆ Authenticator binding should be based on prior registrations and enrollments, but not directly coupled
  - Changing authenticator bindings should not disrupt existing relationships between parties

# Cascading nature of Registration, Enrollment, Authentication



Note: registration and enrollment can be collapsed into a single process, but authentication must always be a distinct process

# Registration




# Reputations

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- ◆ Reputation: a qualitative assessment of a party's suitability for some role; often based on a history of prior transactions conducted by that party
  - Individual identity is founded on inheritance—a reputation of sorts (e.g., pedigree)
  - Most reputations are cumulative:
    - ◆ Credit ratings
    - ◆ Professional or academic competence
    - ◆ Quality or integrity assessments
- ◆ Credentials are often used to state that a party meets certain criteria expressed as qualifications
- ◆ Many organizations involved in maintaining reputations
  - E.g., government agencies, law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, credit reporting agencies, insurance companies, bonding agencies, medical institutions, employers, merchants, professional organizations, academic institutions

# Reputation




# Reputation Services

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- ◆ Tracking and maintaining reputations is a well-established business in many industry segments
  - Credit reporting agencies are one widely-recognized example
  - The Internet has spawned an array of new reputation tracking services and enabled new extensions of traditional services
- ◆ Consumers also have access to reputation tracking services, in particular for financial institutions and merchants
- ◆ Reputation is taking on greater significance in the Internet age
- ◆ Many of the problems associated with authentication are really problems with management of reputations

# The bigger picture...






# Mutual Authentication


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- ◆ The problem with authenticating only one party is that it takes two (or more) parties to communicate
- ◆ If only one party is authenticated then both parties are at risk
  - The authenticated party does not know if the other party is authentic
  - An imposter can impose themselves in place of the unauthenticated party
- ◆ Recent cyber exploits (e.g., phishing) have exploited weak one-way authentication


# The still bigger picture...



# Personas are only Reflected into other Realms



# Personas are only Reflected into other Realms



# Symmetry in Authentication

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- ◆ Authentication is a process that is inherently mutual, although the mechanisms may depend on who is authenticating whom
- ◆ Even individual consumers maintain or use reputation metrics, and have procedures for registering business relationships
- ◆ Business-to-business interactions may involve common reputation services (e.g., D&B) used by both parties
- ◆ Consumers and businesses increasingly register with common services (e.g., DNS, PKI)

# Some issues...

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- ◆ There will always be tradeoffs between *levels of risk* and *convenience*
  - Convenience is a prerequisite for adoption
  - Convenience weakens security, or introduces new risks—sometimes systemic risk
- ◆ Privacy matters
  - To the extent that personal privacy is compromised, integrity of identity attributes is also compromised
  - Weak privacy threatens registration integrity
- ◆ There are great risks in aggregating reputational data and linking this data to credentials

# What is “Identity Theft”?

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- ◆ “Reputation theft” is the problem
  - It is not really possible to steal an identity—even *by cloning*
  - It *is* possible to impersonate another party, usually to assume their reputational metrics
  - The information age has made impersonation easier—especially in the context of weak authentication
- ◆ Goal of reputation theft: Register or enroll to gain credentials for an imposter based on “stolen” reputation
  - Weak security practices during registration and enrollment facilitate reputation theft
  - Weak authentication makes it easy for an imposter to utilize another party’s credentials
  - Damage to victims is to their reputations! (e.g., credit ratings)
- ◆ “Credential theft” is another way to conduct fraud, but it is quite different from reputation (identity) theft

# Preventing “identity theft”

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- ◆ A multi-pronged approach is necessary
  - Protect against misuse of reputation information, and allow parties to actively monitor their reputations
  - Strengthen registration and enrollment processes, and notify parties-of-record of all requests for access to reputation profiles
  - Strengthen authentication measures, and discontinue practice of using identification as a proxy for authentication
- ◆ Rationalize policies governing registration, authentication, and reputation data
  - Close the policy gaps
  - Regularize policies across different domains
  - Modernize policies for the information age



# The Role of Biometrics

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- ◆ Biometric: a technical means of sampling biological characteristics to map to the unique attributes of an individual person
- ◆ Fundamental problem with biometrics: *the individual biological attributes cannot be changed when a compromise occurs*
- ◆ Two uses for biometrics:
  - As an authentication factor (preferably ***without*** dependence on central data base lookups)
  - As a means of detecting the same person registering under multiple persona or attempting to enroll under another party's established relationship

# Biometrics used as Authentication Factors

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- ◆ Ideal model for biometric authentication factors:
  - Users enroll and store biometric parameters in a secure token device owned by the individual
  - Biometric samples/scans are used to unlock the token for use in authentication (or authorization)
  - Additional factors will be needed to deal with errors, or requirements for stronger authentication
- ◆ Storage and communication of biometric information within an organization *may* be appropriate in some contexts (e.g., physical access control)
- ◆ Central storage of biometric parameters for real-time authentication should be avoided
  - Storing biometric samples/scans in a central data base or sending them over networks presents significant problems
  - See “Use of Biometrics as a Registration Parameter”

# Use of Biometrics as a Registration Parameter

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- ◆ Problem: Preventing one individual from registering under multiple persona
  - Biometrics can be used to detect that an individual has registered previously—not necessarily a problem
  - Implied use of central biometric data bases raises substantial concerns with systemic risk
  - Real world example: Bank account signature cards
- ◆ Biometrics used as registration parameters should *not* be used as authentication factors
  - A compromise of the central data base could lead to compromise of authentication, or vice versa

# Two Classes of Biometrics

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- ◆ Class 1:  
Biometrics suitable as authentication factors
  - Fingerprints, voice patterns, heart/pulse wave shapes
  - Convenient to use
  - Simple to scan or sample
- ◆ Class 2:  
Biometrics suitable as registration parameters
  - Retinal scans, face recognition, written signatures
  - Difficult to spoof
  - Can be scanned/sampled with precision

# The Non-Repudiation Myth

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- ◆ Stronger authentication will do very little to counteract repudiation claims
- ◆ Non-repudiation requires multiple sources of evidence that a party knowingly participated in, and authorized, a specific transaction
  - An authorization bound to the transaction (e.g., wet ink signature, digital signature)
  - Proof that the transaction was not modified (integrity)
  - Proof that the authorizing party was fully aware of the terms and conditions (4-corners)
  - Date/time stamping by a trusted party or parties
  - Proof of origin, proof of delivery

# Aside (March 2005)

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- ◆ The remaining slides are somewhat dated, and reflect some perspectives that were relevant in the 2001 – 2002 timeframe
  - They were prepared for a meeting of EFTA's eCPC
  - There was an active debate between Microsoft's Passport and the Liberty Alliance in this meeting
- ◆ However, not a lot has changed, so many of the points made in the following slides are still relevant
- ◆ And the answer turned out to be:  
*A train wreck!*

# Consumer/Merchant Authentication

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- ◆ Reminder: Both consumers and merchants need to authenticate the other party
  - Current over-the-Internet authentication of consumers is very weak—identifying characteristics are being used as a proxy for stronger authentication
  - Over-the-Internet authentication of merchants uses potentially strong measures (e.g., TLS/SSL), but weak in practice
- ◆ Both consumers and merchants have suffered fraud losses due to weak Internet authentication
  - Cyber merchants have been particularly impacted by fraud, but consumers ultimately pay the tab
  - Consumers suffer reputational damage when their credentials are misused

# The disincentives to reform...

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- ◆ Card issuing banks have deflected much of the liability for Internet payments onto merchants—*who pay higher fees for the privilege*
- ◆ Consumers believe they are protected by favorable regulations (in the U.S. only)
- ◆ The card associations enjoy a near monopoly in Internet payments today
- ◆ Use of third-party verification/guarantee and fraud prevention services are now mandated for most merchants



# Internet payment reforms may be coming...

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- ◆ Competition is beginning to emerge from new players (e.g., PayPal), but also from other traditional payment services (e.g., ACH, EFT)
- ◆ Consumer concerns with security for Internet shopping & payments are beginning to register
- ◆ Merchants are looking to implement their own solutions
- ◆ The problems with global retail payments have stymied development of attractive new markets

# What is needed to improve the state of Internet payments?

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- ◆ Financial industry is already equipped...
  - ...to register consumers and merchants and issue them credentials
  - ...to capture reputational data and maintain reputational metrics (credit reporting services)
- ◆ But, authentication practices are weak, especially for Internet-based transactions (*and also MOTO!*)
  - Multi-factor authentication is needed
  - Greater convenience is needed for consumers as well as improved usability of security measures
  - Simpler solutions are needed for merchants
- ◆ Two viable approaches to stronger Internet payment authentication are emerging

# Approach 1: Third-Party Authentication

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- ◆ Basic idea: Consumer authenticates their credentials with a third party, not the merchant (federated identity)
  - Typically, a web redirect to a third party is employed
  - Consumer must have a relationship with third party
  - Third party uses whatever authentication mechanisms meet their needs and that are acceptable to consumers
  - The merchant receives authorization or confirmation of payment from third party
- ◆ Potential third party providers of payment authentication services:
  - Consumer's bank (Issuer)
  - Merchant's bank (Acquirer)
  - Independent payment service provider (e.g., PayPal, non-bank)

# Third-Party Web Payment Services

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- ◆ Visa's 3D Secure (a.k.a., Verified by Visa)
- ◆ NACHA's Project ACTION—the ACH way
- ◆ EFTA's APG Proposal—moving on-line debit cards to the Internet
- ◆ Independent Payment Services
  - PayPal
  - Achex
  - Kelkoo/ING

# Approach 2: Electronic Wallets

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- ◆ Electronic wallets come in many forms (client software, server implementations, smart cards, cell phones, PDAs, RFid tags)
  - Merchant “one-click” solutions are arguably server-based wallets
  - Other players are entering wallet market, including Microsoft and AOL/Time-Warner
- ◆ Most schemes require messaging to credential issuing institution (e.g., consumer’s bank) for confirmation and authorization

# What's likely to emerge for Internet payments?

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- ◆ Hybrid solutions have already emerged, and will likely dominate in the short term
  - Third party payment service providers will manage payment risks and liabilities
  - Electronic wallets will be the preferred way for third parties to authenticate consumers
  - Hybrid approaches will optimize convenience/security for readily available technologies
- ◆ Longer term, electronic wallets embedded in mobile devices will substantially improve both convenience and security
  - Cryptographic tokens will be at the heart of electronic wallets used in new generations of mobile devices

# Authentication problems extend well beyond payments

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- ◆ Merchants need to authenticate consumers for lots of transactions that are *not* payments
  - *E.g.*, Order status inquiries, shipping updates, product registrations, loyalty points, special offers
  - Merchants are already registering consumers as customers and issuing them credentials
  - Merchants maintain their own reputational metrics for consumers, and consumers increasingly utilize reputational rankings for merchants
- ◆ Observation: Authentication solutions that only address payments are of limited value to merchants *and consumers*

# The retail industry is just another bunch of intermediaries



- ◆ Relationships also exists between “brands” and consumers
  - Products get registered  $\Rightarrow$  consumers register with brand (e.g., manufacturer)
  - Over the years, or a lifetime, consumers may buy the same brand many times—mutual reputations
  - If airlines and merchants can give out loyalty points, why not the brands?
  - Authentication needed for many C2B transactions
- ◆ Microsoft perceives that its brand gives it the clout to disintermediate merchants, card associations & banks



# Many other players now seek to provide authentication services



- ◆ The click stream opportunities for providing authentication transactions are enormous
- ◆ Control of the registration process and associated data bases represents enormous power in the Internet economy
- ◆ Reputational information has enormous value
- ◆ If any one player could manage to dominate authentication, reputation and registration they would be well on their way to intergalactic domination

# The Microsoft Strategy

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- ◆ Force everyone who uses MS software to register with them, ditto for their .Net services
- ◆ Provide every user with a Passport authentication client (a type of electronic wallet) and an initial set of credentials (e.g., email address)
- ◆ Address non-payment requirements for merchants and other brands
- ◆ Enable payments via Passport and MS registration services—tap into click stream revenue
- ◆ Build reputation management into .Net

# The Stop Microsoft Movement (circa Q4 2001)

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- ◆ Sun and friends hastily form the Liberty Alliance to do something quick
- ◆ AOL prepares Magic Carpet and hopes it hasn't been caught napping
- ◆ The Card Associations finally start to get serious about credit card authentication
- ◆ A few banks begin to wonder if they should be worried

# Are we heading toward a train wreck?

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- ◆ No security technology can be perfect,—competitors will identify all the flaws in each others products or services in front of an increasingly skeptical public
- ◆ The merchants will be split among competing authentication services, further confusing the public
- ◆ Telcos, ISPs, Wireless Carriers are starting to get in on the act
- ◆ Governments will seek to regulate  
(when regulations are enacted reactively, *be afraid, be very afraid*)
- ◆ Banks will begin to offer their own solutions, possibly competing with the card associations
- ◆ Adoption is likely to be anemic; implying eCommerce will continue to stagnate

# Or will Microsoft win?

## *Some (tongue-in-cheek) conjecture:*



- ◆ MS will stop selling software (which can't be protected from illicit copying anyway) and start selling application click streams
- ◆ The Internet will be absorbed into .Net as the applications and services that define the next generation Internet are all supplied by MS
- ◆ Payment services will be integrated into .Net, but the low-margin account management will be left to the banks, along with the regulatory constraints—Visa and MasterCard will fade into oblivion
- ◆ Governments will start outsourcing tax collections to Microsoft

# Is there any hope?

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- ◆ A broad-based community response is essential and must include the actual users
- ◆ Real-world requirements must be defined, documented and made part of the public debate
- ◆ An open source approach founded on principle of “better security” must deliver workable solutions
- ◆ Governments will have to act in the interests of the common good and health of the global economy
- ◆ Banks and communications providers will have to cooperate and assert their influence on the market

# Prognostications

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- ◆ Most likely: *Train wreck—minimal progress on solving critical problems—we all lose*
- ◆ A reasonable bet: *Microsoft achieves global domination—they win big time, nearly everyone else loses*
- ◆ Long shot: *We get our collective act together and do the right things—we all win (including Microsoft)*

# Thank You



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